Board Member Hauptman Statement on Proposed Permanent Broker-Dealer Inspection Program
Remarks as prepared for delivery
Good morning. Fixing this issue was the first thing I thought of when I got the call about serving in this job at the PCAOB. I support putting this proposal out for public comment.
We’re doing a very American thing today, in that our history of financial regulation, right or wrong, tends to be driven by government’s reaction to disastrous events and then often making tweaks later.
The Civil War led to the creation of the OCC1. The Great Depression led to securities regulation and federal deposit insurance. And on it goes: the 9/11 attacks spurred the current anti-money laundering laws2, Enron and similar frauds led to the PCAOB’s creation, and then Bernie Madoff’s crimes moved Congress to put broker-dealers under scrutiny by the PCAOB3.
The sequence of events tends to go like this:
- Something disastrous happens, creating pressure on government to do something due to understandable public anger and frustration.
- Congress addresses the issue. Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank, etc.
- Sometime later, after the real-world effects of Congress’ response play out, tweaks are often made to the original policy to fine-tune it and address unintended consequences.
Today we’re doing step 3: making needed changes to an earlier policy.
And I want to explain why, because broker-dealer regulation can get complicated pretty quickly. Compliance reports. Exemption reports. Carrying firms. Clearing firms. Introducing firms. By the time you get to the third one, you have already lost everyone who does not do this for a living. So let me try to make this simple.
Today, the PCAOB inspects accounting firms that audit two very different kinds of broker-dealers.
Some broker-dealers hold customer cash and securities. Others generally do not. But our current inspection program essentially puts both into the same basic framework. That can feel like trying to force a square peg into a round hole. We have different businesses presenting different risks, yet we are trying to fit them into the same regulatory structure. This proposal tries to fix that.
We would focus our inspections on accounting firms that audit broker-dealers that actually hold customer assets. We generally would not inspect an accounting firm solely because it audits broker-dealers that do not hold customer assets. That is the basic change we are proposing. And there is an important point about what we are not doing. We are not eliminating the audits and reviews the SEC requires for these broker-dealers. And we are not saying PCAOB standards no longer apply to those engagements. Those requirements remain.
What we are reconsidering is whether regular PCAOB inspection adds enough protection on top of those existing requirements. And to me, that raises a pretty basic question: Where does PCAOB inspection provide the most meaningful protection to investors?
We have had an interim broker-dealer inspection program since 2011. So after roughly 15 years, we have real experience to help answer that question. And the data tell an interesting story. Broker-dealers that generally receive, handle, or hold customer cash and securities represent only about five percent of the broker-dealer population. But they account for about 99 percent of aggregate net capital requirements and 81 percent of aggregate assets.
There is also a common-sense way to think about the difference. It is pretty hard to steal customer assets if you do not have custody of customer assets in the first place. Now, that does not mean a broker-dealer without custody cannot do something wrong. Of course it can. Fraud and other misconduct can take many forms. But the risk is different. And if the risk is different, it does not make much sense to force a square peg into a round hole and regulate both situations as though they present exactly the same danger.
Congress recognized that distinction. It allowed us to differentiate among broker-dealers and to consider whether inspection schedules should differ depending on whether they receive, handle, or hold customer cash and securities. That is the basic idea behind this proposal: focus our inspections where the risk to customer assets is greatest.
But there is a number in our own data that might make you stop and say: Wait a minute. In 2025, the financial statement audit deficiency rate for firms that only audited exemption-report filers was 81 percent. So why in the world would we inspect them less often?
Because the deficiency rate alone does not tell us what kind of problems we are finding or what risk those problems pose to investors. Some deficiencies are more directly connected to protecting customer assets than others. For broker-dealers that hold customer assets, our inspection findings have included problems with reserve calculations and possession or control of customer securities. For broker-dealers that generally do not hold customer assets, the deficiencies have more often involved reporting, required inquiries, and other review procedures. All of those requirements matter. But the deficiency rate alone does not tell us where investors face the greatest risk.
Investor protection is the destination. Inspection is one of the tools for getting there. And if inspection is a tool, we should use it where it can do the most good.
Congress created the PCAOB to protect investors, but it did not tell us to regulate without regard to cost. And when I say cost, I am not just talking about how much money the PCAOB spends. I mean something much broader.
When Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley, it was already concerned about competition and choice in the audit market. Section 701 directed a study of competition, including whether regulation could impede it and whether limited competition could mean higher costs, lower quality, or fewer choices. That tells me Congress understood something important. The health of the audit market is part of investor protection. It is not separate from investor protection.
Regulation can cause firms to leave a market. It can discourage other firms from entering. It can reduce competition and leave businesses with fewer choices. We cannot easily count the firms that never entered the market or the services that were never offered. But those costs are real.
Imagine you run a ten-person accounting firm with a few broker-dealer clients, none of which holds customer assets. At some point, the cost of PCAOB registration and inspection may make those engagements no longer worth taking on.
When I worked in the Senate, I recall getting a letter from one of these audit firms, in which they asked Congress to reform the inspection process because it was flawed in ways that discouraged quality audits by not appropriately reflecting the differences among firms and the work they perform.
Or another capable firm may look at the same cost-benefit calculation and decide never to enter the market at all. Nobody writes a report about that firm. But the market still lost a potential competitor and broker-dealers lost another choice. None of this means we should eliminate an investor protection simply because it costs money. That would be the wrong lesson.
The question is whether the regulation is actually addressing the risk we are worried about. And here, we have an opportunity to be more precise.
For broker-dealers where customer assets are actually being held, we continue inspecting their auditors. For broker-dealers where those customer assets are not being held, the underlying SEC requirements remain and PCAOB standards still apply. But we step back and ask whether regular PCAOB inspection of the accounting firms auditing those broker-dealers adds enough investor protection to justify the additional regulatory burden. To me, that is not walking away from investor protection. It is trying to match the regulation to the risk.
The interim program has been running for roughly 15 years. We have experience and data. Now we have an opportunity to use what we have learned to build a permanent program focused more directly on actual risk. We should put our reasoning on the table and let people tell us where we got it right and where we did not. We should not pretend regulators have all the answers before the public gets a chance to kick the tires. So I support putting this proposal out for comment.
I would leave you with three things. First, we are not eliminating the underlying audits. Second, we are proposing to focus regular PCAOB inspections where investor assets are actually at stake. Third, for broker-dealers that do not hold customer assets, we are asking whether regular PCAOB inspection is actually adding meaningful protection for investors. The health of the audit market is part of investor protection. It is not separate from investor protection.
With that, I would like to recognize the staff who worked on this proposal: from the Office of the General Counsel, George Kostolampros, Matt Goldin, Katherine Kelly, and Marc Francis; from the Office of Economic and Risk Analysis, Ying Compton, Tian Liang, Rahsan Inget, John Cook, Tasneem Raihan, Eric Carlson, and Shayna Vereen; and from the Division of Registration and Inspections, Christine Gunia, Duane Abel, and Greg MacCune.
And I’d also like to recognize my fellow Board Member Mark Calabria and his team, Rebecca Mealey and Michelle Jackson, who did a lot of the heavy lifting on this proposal.
Thank you.