Making It Permanent: Support for Releasing the Broker-Dealer Permanent Program for Public Comment

Remarks as prepared for delivery

Thank you, Chairman Logothetis.

I am pleased to support releasing for public comment the proposing release titled Program of Inspection Related to Audits of Brokers and Dealers and Related Engagements. AKA the Broker-Dealer Permanent Program.

Before turning to the substance, I want to thank the people who got this proposal to the Board, on a tight deadline and after a great deal of work.

First, my thanks to the Office of the General Counsel, especially Katherine Kelly and Marc Francis, who led the drafting and shepherded this release through many versions. Thank you also to our colleagues in the Office of Economic and Risk Analysis, especially Ying Compton, Tian Liang, and John Cook, who built the economic analysis reported in this proposal. And thank you to the other staff in OGC, OERA, and the Division of Registration and Inspections who supported this effort. Meeting this deadline took a lot of long days, and it shows in the quality of the work.

I also want to thank the Chairman’s Office, and in particular Danette Edwards, who worked diligently with my staff to make sure that the concerns and comments of the Board Groups, and of the SEC, were addressed.

Thank you also to my fellow Board members and their staff. The early issue-spotting and constructive engagement across multiple drafts reflect an effective collaborative process.

Finally, thank you to the staff of the SEC for their engagement throughout this process and for their constructive contributions to this proposal.

In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act extended the PCAOB’s oversight to auditors of broker-dealers. Importantly, Congress did not prescribe a one-size-fits-all approach. Under the statute1, the Board may, by rule, establish an inspection program for broker-dealer auditors and may take into account the differences among categories of brokers and dealers. In 2011, the Board adopted an interim inspection program, generally including all broker-dealer auditors. It was meant to be temporary, in part so that the Board could gain experience before deciding what a permanent program should look like. More than a decade later, we have that experience. Our staff has inspected hundreds of firms that audit broker dealers, and reviewed more than 2,000 engagements. It is time to take what we have learned and turn it into a durable framework.

This proposed permanent inspection program would focus inspection oversight where the risk to investors is greatest. Broker-dealers that file compliance reports generally receive, handle, or hold customer cash and securities. Broker-dealers that file exemption reports typically do not. Under the proposal, auditors of the first group would be inspected, with annual inspection for firms that audit more than ten such broker-dealers and at least triennial inspection for the rest. Audits of broker-dealers that file exemption reports would fall outside the proposed inspection program. I believe that this approach is commonsense, risk-based, and tied to the investor-protection purpose of the statute. It also gives auditors and broker-dealers certainty and clarity, which an interim program could not.

From the beginning of the interim inspection program through the end of 2025, our DRI staff has inspected 445 firms that audit broker-dealers and reviewed portions of 1,438 audits, 301 examination engagements, and 813 review engagements.2

So what did the interim inspection program teach us?

First, the industry is not uniform. Generally, some broker-dealers carry or clear and hold customer cash and securities. They file compliance reports and their auditors perform much more extensive examinations. Others, generally introducing firms, do not hold customer assets. They file exemption reports and their auditors merely perform reviews.

Second, the assets and the risk are concentrated. The largest 1 percent of broker-dealers account for 78 percent of total assets, and the top 5 percent account for 99 percent.3 Compliance report filers tend to hold the higher net capital and total assets. Together, compliance report filers account for about 81 percent of total assets, while exemption report filers account for 19 percent.4

Third, the deficiency rates do not tell the whole story. Our inspectors have found deficiencies in audits of both groups. In 2015, for example, we found deficiencies in 83 percent of audits of compliance report filers and 76 percent of audits of exemption report filers.5 For 2025, the deficiency rate for reviews of exemption reports was 49 percent at firms that audited only exemption report filers, compared with 26 percent at firms that also audited compliance report filers.6 I want to be clear that these numbers are high, and that deficient audit work is never acceptable.

However, those deficiency rates do not distinguish by severity or potential impact. Picture a city's crime report that counts every incident the same way: each parking ticket is one incident, and each bank robbery is one incident. The total would accurately show far more parking violations than bank robberies, but it would tell us very little about serious crime. That data is not very useful for deciding where to put the police. A misdemeanor and a felony are both violations, but no one would treat them the same way when it was time to hand out discipline. Deficiency counts work the same way. A missed disclosure in the notes to the financial statements of a firm that holds no customer assets is NOT the same as a failure to test whether customer cash and securities are actually safeguarded. Going back to my analogy, it makes sense that we should put our inspectors where the most harm to customers could occur.

The proposal makes a deliberate choice to concentrate on the audits where customer cash and securities are at stake. That choice has a price. Audits of exemption report filers would no longer be inspected, and I do not want to minimize that. But a program that tries to look everywhere risks seeing too little where it matters most. I would rather we be clear about that trade-off and invite the public to weigh in on whether we have struck the right balance.

That is the lesson of the interim program, and it is why the proposal focuses on the audits of broker-dealers that hold customer assets.

So Now I Am Asking for the Public’s Help

A proposal is only as good as the feedback it receives. Over the last few months, I have listened to stakeholders about how a permanent program might be designed. Now that the proposal is public, I invite all stakeholders to share their views. Answer the questions raised in the proposal.

  • Tell us what objectives and lessons should shape a permanent program?
  • Share with us whether the differences between a introducing broker-dealer that does not hold customer assets and a carrying or clearing firm should inform the scope and frequency of inspections?
  • What competitive effects, if any, should the Board consider, including effects on firms of different sizes and on the market for broker-dealer audits?

Please be specific in your letters. Data, real-world experience, and concrete alternatives help us most, as do views on the costs and benefits of the approach we propose, and/or the alternatives suggested. We will read every comment.

Closing

This proposal is a step towards a stable, risk-focused program that protects customers and reflects what we have learned. I look forward to the comments, and I support releasing the proposal for public comment. Thank you again to everyone who made this possible.

1 Under Section 104(a)(2) of Sarbanes-Oxley, as amended by Dodd-Frank, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7214(a)(2), the Board may, by rule, conduct and require a program of inspection of registered public accounting firms that provide one or more audit reports for a broker or dealer, and may allow for differentiation among classes of brokers and dealers. If the Board establishes such a program, it must consider whether differing inspection schedules are appropriate for firms that issue audit reports only for brokers or dealers that do not receive, handle, or hold customer securities or cash or are not members of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation. Any such rules are subject to prior SEC approval under Section 107(b) of Sarbanes-Oxley (15 U.S.C. § 7217(b)).

2 See Annual Report on the Interim Inspection Program Related to Audits of Brokers and Dealers, PCAOB Release No. 2026-003 (June 11, 2026).

3 See Exhibit 1 in Program of Inspection Related to Audits of Brokers and Dealers and Related Engagements, PCAOB Rel. No. 2026-009 (Nov. 19, 2026) (“Proposing Release”).

4 See Exhibit 2 in the Proposing Release.

5 See Exhibit 8 in the Proposing Release.

6 See Exhibit 7 in the Proposing Release.