Statement on the PCAOB’s 2027 Budget

Remarks as prepared for delivery

Good morning and thank you, Chairman Logothetis,

I want to start by recognizing the budget team for their work. Putting together this budget package involves not only a high level of professional expertise but also an enormous effort sustained over a long period. For several years, I have seen up close not only their hard, dedicated work, but also their total mastery of the subject matter. Mia Holland, Jim Hearn, Yoss Missaghian, Alfredo Azocar, Marcia Cadasqueves do Nascimento, Deb Smith, and Randy Thornton: thank you all. I also want to thank the staff across all our offices and divisions who played a role in developing the budget before us today.

In addition, I want to recognize and thank Lorene Rosenberg for her leadership and guidance in developing the PCAOB’s 2026 to 2030 Strategic Plan. The five-year strategic plan also reflects the work of many staff as well as the valuable and insightful input received across all our stakeholder groups. 

I want to focus my remarks this morning on the proposed 2027 budget. In considering the proposed budget over recent weeks, I have, on one hand, been heartened by a realization about the overall budget number: it is in line with what might be considered a steady state period in the eleven years from 2012 through 2022 – a period after the PCAOB’s initial build-up to a mature, stable level, but before some years of atypically large budget increases starting with 2023.

Even when the overall annual expenditures from 2012 through 2022 are adjusted for inflation, the proposed total budget amount before us today compares favorably to them. It is in fact higher than the adjusted expenditures in eight of those eleven years, and it is nearly three percent higher than the average annual expenditures over those eleven years.1

On the other hand, I have been disheartened by a component that differs significantly from what it was in the 2012 through 2022 period. The proposed budget for our Division of Registration and Inspections, or DRI, is lower than the inflation-adjusted DRI expenditures in eight of those eleven years, and it is more than eight percent lower than the average annual adjusted DRI expenditures over those eleven years.2

The main driver of the budgetary trade-off is easy to identify. Owing in large part to an aggressive pursuit of technological advancement, the proposed budget before us includes $71.2 million for technology. By comparison, in the period from 2012 through 2022, inflation-adjusted technology expenditures averaged just over $41.8 million and peaked at 56.5 million.3

I want to be clear that I am in favor of making substantial investments in technology and related training. While I do not believe that our currently available tools are insufficient to the work that we currently need to do, or that we are particularly lagging behind other regulators, things are obviously changing rapidly and, of course, we should invest in keeping up with technology tools that are fit for our particular purpose.

But in my view, some of the budget that is being allocated to technology in 2027 should instead be added to the DRI budget. 

I believe that our conduct of inspections, and in particular our longstanding approach to carrying out the statutory command to review selected audit engagements “performed at various offices and by various associated persons of the inspected firm,”4 is the single most effective thing that the PCAOB does to drive and sustain improvements in audit quality. I have been saying that publicly for a while, and I have not heard it challenged. Rather, I frequently hear it echoed by firm personnel, retired audit partners, and audit committee members, who have had front row seats to observe the impact of PCAOB inspections.

That aspect of our inspection work involves selecting audits based on factors that suggest the existence of heightened auditing challenges and then reviewing those audits through a process of engagement with the audit team and, often, other senior firm personnel.5 That process drives and, equally important, helps sustain improvements in audit quality. By repeating that process on as many of a firm’s most challenging audits as our resources can support, the benefits for audit quality multiply.6

I have weighed that consideration against a concern that the technology initiatives planned for 2027 may be overly ambitious, potentially leading us to underspend or misspend, and that the expenditures are not likely to pay off in 2027 in a way that contributes meaningfully to the efficiency or productivity of our inspection staff. I have approached that weighing with humility and with regard for the reality that reasonable people can disagree about it. But I cannot escape the conviction that the interests of investors, and the public interest, in audit quality would be far better served by a materially different allocation of 2027 funds between inspections and technology.

In considering the reduction in the DRI budget and headcount, I have taken into account, among other things, that the results of our recent inspections of the largest firms seem consistent with a view that our inspections have caused them to improve. And I have also considered whether some people might see that apparent improvement as a justification for reducing the resources we allocate to inspections.

On that point, I have recalled words that stuck with me, written by Simon Winchester, a well-known author of many works of historical journalism, who passed away early this month. He noted that one challenge of complex systems is that “their natural tendency is to regress if not constantly monitored – and occasionally even when monitored vigorously.”7  

We have come a long way since Congress created the PCAOB. An entire generation of auditors who were not around for the shocks that led Congress to do so are now more than 20 years into an auditing career during which PCAOB inspections have always been there. PCAOB review of audit engagements may now seem to some like something that could be scaled back without any meaningful loss. I would be concerned, however, that, with any significant scaling back, we might find that audit quality has a “natural tendency” to regress.

I would like briefly to describe one other significant concern I have about this proposed budget, but I first want to frame it by reference to the PCAOB’s by-laws. The by-laws give the PCAOB Chairman broad authority to direct the operations and staff of the PCAOB but, as to the budget, there is specifically reserved to the Board as a whole, “responsibility and authority with respect to determining the distribution of funds according to major programs and purposes, including those related to salary schedules and other conditions of employment.”8

Although I will not go into detail here about a non-public aspect of the proposed budget, it takes an approach that is markedly different from previous budgets with respect to compensation of the skilled and dedicated staff who remain with us. In my view, that approach is not in the best interests of the PCAOB’s long-term ability to carry out its statutory mission as successfully as the PCAOB has done to date.

For those reasons, I will not vote in favor of this budget. Nevertheless, I take comfort that the day-to-day work of the PCAOB continues to be in the hands of serious, experienced, technically expert staff who are dedicated to the statutory mission. They impress me constantly, and I am proud to work with and among them. I also value, and look forward to continuing, a collegial and collaborative relationship with my fellow Board members – and their talented and committed staff – as we move forward.

1 To arrive at the inflation-adjusted amounts referred to in this discussion, actual annual expenditures as reported in the PCAOB’s public budget documents were adjusted from January of the relevant year to October of 2026, using the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI Inflation Calculator.

2 Essentially the same conclusions hold when the travel portion of the DRI budget is removed from the analysis, even though travel was much lower during the COVID pandemic.

3 In the “actual” expenditures column in the Board’s public budget documents (published for any given year in connection with the budget adopted two years later), these expenditures are reported as line items labeled “Office of Technology” (since 2023), “Data, Security and Technology” (2019-2022), and “Office of Information Technology” (2012-2018).

4 Section 104(d)(1) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.

5 For a detailed discussion of the elements and value of this process, see “A Deep Dive into the Current Practice” in George R. Botic, The Role of the Financial Statement Auditor, and Thoughts on the PCAOB Inspection Process and Its Contemplated Transformation | PCAOB, October 5, 2026.

6 I want to emphasize that the purpose and objective of the process is to drive audit quality improvement in that way, rather than having anything to do with developing or publishing broader conclusions about a firm’s audit practice based on the audits selected for inspection. Since the Board began performing regular inspections in 2004, the Board has made this point in the public report on every inspection of an annually inspected firm. The wording has varied over time but, for example, reports on those inspections since 2019 state that “[o]ur selection of audits for review does not constitute a representative sample of the firm’s total population of issuer audits,” noting that “[w]e make the majority of our selections based on (1) our internal valuation of audits we believe have a heightened risk of material misstatement, including those with challenging audit areas, and (2) other risk-based characteristics, including issuer and firm considerations.” See also Inspection Data for U.S. Global Network Firms | PCAOB and Inspection Data for Non-Affiliate Annual Firms | PCAOB (summarizing inspection results but noting that “the data should be understood in light of contextualizing information provided with each report, including (1) it relates only to the audits selected for review, which does not constitute a representative sample of the firm’s total population of issuer audits, and only to the particular portions of the issuer audits reviewed; (2) for various reasons, inspection results are not necessarily comparable over time or among firms; (3) inspection results are not an assessment of all of the firm’s audit work nor of all of the audit procedures performed for the audits reviewed; and (4) inspection reports are not intended to serve as overall rating tools”).

7 Simon Winchester, The Perfectionists - How Precision Engineers Created the Modern World (New York: HarperCollins, 2018), 212.