Toward a Permanent, More Focused Inspection Program for Auditors of Broker-Dealers

Remarks as prepared for delivery

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I support today’s proposal for a permanent program of inspection relating to audits of brokers and dealers (broker-dealers). After years of data gathering and stakeholder feedback, it is time to take the next step towards making our “interim” inspection program permanent. I look forward to reading public comments on this proposal and voting on a final rule early next year.

In 2011, then Board Member Dan Goelzer spoke about the interim inspection program at a forum in New Jersey.1 At that time, the program was new, authorized by Congress just a year earlier through the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, and its design was considered temporary. In many ways, his remarks at that forum were prescient.

Mr. Goelzer said, “the Board recognizes that its broker-dealer auditor oversight program must reflect the diversity of the broker-dealer population and the wide differences in risk profiles.” Less than 1 percent of broker-dealers, he noted, held over 75 percent of the net capital in the entire broker-dealer industry, and less than 7 percent maintained custody of their client’s securities and cash. These and other variations among broker-dealers raised questions, in his view, “about whether and how, on a long-term basis, we should devote resources to inspecting the auditors of all of these categories of brokers and dealers.”

As if he had a crystal ball, Mr. Goelzer forecast the rule proposed today: “I believe that the Board will ultimately conclude,” Mr. Goelzer said, “that the auditors of some significant category of broker-dealers can safely be exempted from PCAOB oversight without compromising investor protection. But, those decisions, when they are made, will be based, not on speculation, but on empirical information that we gather during the next several years.”

Today, there is still significant diversity among broker-dealers. Relatively few broker-dealers account for most of the net capital and total assets reported by all broker-dealers. The significant risk of loss to investors – where it exists -- relates to broker-dealers that receive, handle, or hold customer securities and cash. For this reason, the proposed rule focuses on the auditors of those broker-dealers – more specifically, on the auditors of broker-dealers that are compliance report filers under Exchange Act Rule 17a-5. Compliance report filers (about 5 percent of broker-dealers) account for approximately 99 percent of aggregate net capital requirements and 81 percent of aggregate total assets. Audits of exemption report filers would be carved out of the proposed permanent inspection program.

I agree that focusing on audits of compliance report filers makes sense because that is where deficiencies are most likely to impact customer asset protection and investor protection generally. Sharpening our focus on the firms that do these audits will allow more regular oversight of the engagements associated with customer asset risk.

I also like the proposal to issue and publish individual, firm-specific reports for inspections conducted under the new program, consistent with our existing issuer inspection report framework. Currently, the PCAOB issues a single annual report that does not identify individual registered public accounting firms. The new approach – which Mr. Goelzer also forecast in his 2011 remarks -- would provide more transparency regarding inspection findings and audit quality and help inspected firms by providing more specific and timely feedback.

While I support the general direction of this proposal for a permanent inspection program, I am interested in reading public comments on alternative approaches. The proposal mentions an alternative that would include exemption filers within the permanent inspection program but subject them to less intensive inspections with a narrower scope. Under this alternative, inspections would focus on the auditor’s review of the exemption report, rather than the review engagement and related financial statement audit. As discussed in the proposing release, there are costs and benefits to this alternative. I would like to hear from our stakeholders on this idea, as well as their insights on any other aspect of the proposal.

Finally, I thank the Office of the General Counsel, the Office of Economic and Risk Analysis, as well as my fellow Board Member Mark Calabria and his staff, for their hard work on this proposal. Their collaboration and insights made this proposal possible.

Back to you, Mr. Chairman.